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As politicians around Europe are formulating and revising action plans against radicalization 
and violence-promoting extremism, teachers and social workers are increasingly being made 
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Abstract 
In this article, I ask which problematizations of racism and intolerance that 
substantiate a local implementation of a targeted educational program in Sweden, 
called the Tolerance Project. By participating in municipality-level meetings and 
conversations with front-line professionals concerning the recent implementation of 
the program in one specific region, I have found several motivations for the continuing 
work to reduce racism and intolerance at schools. To emphasize this point, I have 
divided the problematizations into four ideal types and applied a ‘what’s the problem 
represented to be’ analysis to each of them. The four problematizations can be 
described in the following terms: generational racism, growth of the Sweden 
Democrats, normalization of racist language, and general ‘at-risk’ youths. The first 
three problematizations are context dependent, in terms of both time (during the so-
called refugee crisis) and space (in a region with a long history of National Socialism). 
Problematizing generational racism, growth of the Sweden Democrats and 
normalization of racist language indicate that what is mainly to be prevented is anti-
immigrant sentiments in the young as well as the adult population. This implies a 
limitation to the role of schools in prevention, as adults cannot be directly targeted by 
the school. The fourth ideal type, at-risk youth, emphasizes that there are certain risk 
factors that might cause young people to later radicalize or deviate in one way or 
another. This corresponds to the general discourse of radicalization, but, in line with 
other studies of front-line professionals’ perspectives, there is no clear distinction 
between preventing radicalization and fostering democratic citizens. Furthermore, the 
conglomeration of problematizations might decrease the stigmatizing effect that a 
targeted initiative can have, as opposed to initiatives that operate with one specific 
target group. The Tolerance Project might thus be a useful model for the prevention of 












aware of their important role in prevention. In some countries, the authorities have gone far in 
imposing responsibilities on front-line professionals, such as through the British ‘Prevent 
duty’, which entails that teachers and others are obliged to report individuals suspected of 
radicalization (Busher et al. 2017). In high trust-based societies such as the Nordic ones, there 
is currently no such thing as an educator’s duty to report ‘signs of radicalization’.2   
Nevertheless schools have a mandate to foster democracy, and teachers are expected to 
identify pupils that need to be paid extra attention, according to the prevailing situation. This 
places a lot of trust and power in the hands of front-line professionals such as teachers and 
other youth workers. 
According to a recent evaluation of national action plans against radicalization in the 
Nordic countries, there is a general tendency to stress the importance of education, without 
necessarily suggesting any concrete initiatives (Sivenbring 2017). This does not mean that 
there are no preventive initiatives available; rather, there is a lack of analysis of such works 
(Bjørgo and Gjelsvik 2015), especially work against right-wing extremism (Fangen and 
Carlsson 2013) and antisemitism (Löwander and Hagström 2011). There is also a lack of up-
to-date studies of right-wing extremist or extreme nationalist groups, as the qualitative studies 
conducted in the 1990s have not continued to the same extent since then (Bjørgo and Gjelsvik 
2015). A logical consequence of this is that the national action plans against radicalization in 
the Nordic countries are still influenced by how the environments looked during the 1990s. 
Because of the lack of evaluations and analyses of local preventive initiatives, it is mostly up 
to the preventive agents designated by the governments to describe exactly what is to be 
prevented and how to do so.  
During the school year 2015/2016, a Holocaust-based educational program to reduce 
racism and intolerance among youths called the Tolerance Project (TP) was implemented in 
several municipalities in Sweden. This serves as a timely case to explore how the national 
                                                 
2 There is, however, a growing concern among scholars that educators, influenced by the national security 
discourse, look for signs of radicalization, although it is not their official duty to do so (See Mattsson and Säljö’s 













recommendation to work with prevention in schools is being implemented locally. Apart from 
a study of the economic benefits of reducing young people’s engagement in racist 
environments in the municipality where it was developed (Lundmark and Nilsson 2013), the 
Tolerance Project has never been externally evaluated (Hertz 2016). The program is 
nevertheless listed as a case of best practice in the Guide to countering far-right extremism, 
published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (Ramalingam 2014).  
The Tolerance Project builds on well-established democratic and educational 
principles in Sweden and functions as an elective course for upper-secondary pupils. It 
culminates with a trip to Holocaust memorial sites in Poland (Mattsson and Adler 2008). 
Because it constitutes an additional expense for the municipality, each municipality must 
select in which areas or schools it should be implemented. Once a school is chosen, all pupils 
in the eighth or ninth grade can apply, but it is the project leaders (teachers or other youth 
workers) who select the participants. A central purpose is to create a dynamic group 
consisting of both intolerant and confident pupils. Certain pupils are therefore encouraged or 
recommended to apply. Since the project operates only at some schools and is offered to a 
small selection of pupils, some kind of problem analysis must be made prior to 
implementation, based on local needs and assumptions. In this article, I will try to shed some 
light on this problem analysis by asking what the problem of racism and intolerance is 
represented to be in this specific preventive environment.  
The ‘what is the problem represented to be’ approach is derived from a policy analysis 
based on the discursive notion that, as discourses, policies are not just reactions or solutions to 
problems but also constitute or give shape to them (Bacchi 2009). I am thus not examining the 
efficiency of the program or the solutions to the issues of racism and intolerance, but which 
target groups the front-line professionals involved in the implementation are working with. 
Which problematizations of racism and intolerance substantiate local implementations of the 
Tolerance Project? Considering that the teachers and youth workers that work with the TP are 
not restricted to working only with this program, their take on prevention might say 












and how this corresponds to the national discourse on radicalization represented in the 




In 2011 the Swedish government presented the first national action plan against violence-
promoting extremism (Government Offices of Sweden 2011). The plan addresses what they 
called ‘the White Power environment’, which has a long history in Sweden (Lööw 2015), ‘the 
autonomist environment’ which is the opposite of the White Power environment, and ‘the 
Islamist extremist movement’ which is the newest threat according to the Swedish Security 
Police. The government’s attempt to tackle all kinds of extremism with one strategy has been 
critiqued for undermining the ideologies and different causes that lie behind versions of 
extremism as well as for too much of a focus on youth (Lööw et al. 2013). In addition to the 
claim made in the action plan “that it is primarily young men who join violent extremist 
movements” (Government Offices of Sweden 2011: 10), half of the suggested measures 
concern already established youth work organizations, such as The Swedish Agency for 
Youth and Civil Society (MUCF). Although the Tolerance Project was not mentioned in the 
plan, its growing implementation should be understood in this context. Four years later, the 
TP was given a salient role in the government-initiated Segerstedt Institute: a resource centre 
against violence-promoting ideologies and structures and racist organizations, at Gothenburg 
University. The centre was inaugurated in August 2015 and has since arranged and 
coordinated the education of new Tolerance Project leaders from other parts of the country. 
Initially created in Kungälv to prevent youths from joining a National Socialist environment 
prevalent in the 1990s, the program is now being developed in other municipalities and 
contexts. When it was first developed, emphasis was put on recruiting young individuals on 
the fringes of the local Nazi environment. The presence of a Nazi environment is currently not 
a prerequisite for implementing the model, but the aim remains to “sow a seed of doubt” 












that the main problems to be prevented are youths with racist attitudes or youths who flirt 
with racist environments. This is easier said than done. A central challenge for any 
implementation of anti-racist programs is to adapt the broad definition of racism that has 
become widely used in Sweden. 
 
The Meaning of Racism  
Traditional racism is usually defined as the idea that humans can be divided into 
hierarchically and genetically distinct groups. Since it was found that there is no such thing as 
genetically distinct human races, critical race theorists have argued for a broadening of the 
term to capture contemporary forms of hostility towards outgroups, and the term has been 
given a broader meaning including ‘cultural racism’ (Balibar 1991) or ‘racism without race’ 
(Miles 1993). Within this framework, it is further argued that racism is inherent in everyday 
structures and is not a problem for individuals as in “to be or not to be a racist” (Essed 1991: 
3). This broad definition of racism is clearly evident in the latest National plan to combat 
racism, similar forms of hostility and hate crime, “that different cultures are unable to coexist 
has come to be an expression of racism today” (Government Offices of Sweden 2017: 11). 
The plan problematizes both traditional racism, which can be found in extreme nationalist 
ideology, and structural and unconscious racism, which can be found everywhere among a 
larger proportion of the population. Theoretically (and often in practice), this broad definition 
of racism can be applied to the anti-immigrant party of the Sweden Democrats 
(Sverigedemokraterna – SD). According to the SD, it is immigrants from Muslim countries 
especially that “have found it hardest to harmoniously coexist with Swedish and Western 
culture” (SD program 2011: 27). As this is in stark contrast to the otherwise multicultural and 
pro-immigrant discourse in Sweden (Borevi 2012), the Sweden Democrats can (and often are) 
















Another reason why the Sweden Democrats are labelled culturally racist or ‘culturally 
nationalist’ (Teitelbaum 2017) is that they grew out of the militant activist group called Keep 
Sweden Swedish (Bevara Sverige Svenskt – BSS) in 1988. The Party leader since 2005 
Jimmy Åkesson has attempted to get rid of the racist stamp by evicting controversial members 
from the party and promoting a ‘zero-tolerance’ of racism. Despite such efforts, the remaining 
political establishment in Sweden has refused to cooperate with the party, which has probably 
contributed to their continued growth since they are seen as the only party that address the 
consequences of immigration (Kiiskinen and Saveljeff 2010). In the national election in 2010, 
they entered parliament with 5.7 percent support and in 2014 with 12.9 percent support. 
During the so-called refugee ‘crisis’ in 2015, Sweden received 162, 877 asylum seekers, the 
highest amount per capita in Europe (Geddes and Scholten 2016). Until the government 
tightened its asylum policy on 24 November 2015, the Sweden Democrats were the only 
parliamentary party that wanted to severely restrict immigration, particularly from Muslim 
populations. By the end of that year, Party support reached 19.9 percent (Statistics Sweden 
November 2015). 
The largest organization in Sweden that still promotes traditional racism; with the 
meaning that humans can be divided into different biological races that cannot mix or coexist, 
is the self-declared National Socialist Nordic Resistance Movement (Nordiska 
motståndsrörelsen – NMR). Established in Sweden in 1997, the organization has since 2015 
been a pan-Nordic movement that seeks to establish a unified Nordic state consisting of what 
they believe to be an ethnically homogeneous Nordic people (Nordfront 2016). Inspired by 
the parliamentary success of the SD, and the attempt by the National Socialist Party of 
Swedes (Svenskarnas Parti - SvP) to gain influence between 2009 and 2014, the NMR 
announced its own parliamentary branch in 2015. When the SvP dissolved in May 2015, the 
NMR immediately recruited former SvP members and is now the biggest National Socialist 
organization in the Nordic countries. While the description of the White Power environment 












(Government Offices of Sweden 2011: 44: 15), the leading figures of the NMR are currently 
around 35 years old (Expo 2016). Although the NMR consists of people of all ages, most of 
them have been part of the racist environment for a long time. 
 
Research on Ways into Racist Environments 
A central point in the life stories of former activists is that they became engaged in the 
White Power environment when still teenagers (Kimmel 2007; Fangen 1999; Lööw 1995). 
The way into racist movements often starts with difficulties in coping with school, such as 
learning difficulties or being bullied. Entry may therefore be an attempt to fill different social 
and psychological needs, such as for belonging, identity, friends, protection, status or 
excitement, and to a lesser extent may be due to ideological conviction (Simi et al. 2016; 
Lööw 2009; Kimmel 2007; Bjørgo and Carlsson 2005; Fangen 2001). Another central point in 
some defector stories is contact with an older person in the racist environment, such as 
another family member (Mattsson and Adler 2008; Kimmel 2007). This corresponds to the 
general socialization theory that children are mostly influenced in the home (Allport 1954). A 
more applied term for racism learned at home (through immediate or extended family) is 
generational racism, a point that has been made in an attempt to show the geographical 
stronghold of the White Power environment in some parts of Sweden (Lööw 2009). In a 
comparison of votes for National Socialist parties in 1938 with votes for the Sweden 
Democrats in 1991 and the Party of Swedes in 2014 in a selection of 35 municipalities, the 
geographical stronghold theory was tested, but determined to be in need of further 
examination (Blombäck 2016).  
 
The Role of Schools in Prevention 
Thinking of the amount of time children spend at school as a way of shaping identity, 
as well as having the overall aim of preparing children for adult life, it is commonly 
acknowledged that schools have an important role in the fostering of democracy and thereby 












racism and intolerance, such as the work that is done in schools, is argued to be not very 
different from primary or general crime prevention (Bjørgo 2015). Safeguarding democracy is 
thus something that is going on in everyday practices at school, but, as in any institution, 
sometimes extra measures are needed. Implementation of the Tolerance Project is an example 
of that. Secondary efforts, what can be called targeted initiatives, must handle the challenge 
that it is not clear at an early age which youths will end up in extreme environments and 
which not. The trend towards parliamentary nationalism, as opposed to the White Power 
skinhead culture of the 1980s and 1990s, implies that members of extreme groups are 
becoming less visible. As an example of that, in a study of radical-right activists among 
students in Germany, teachers differed when it came to whether they were able to identify the 
activists or not (Miller-Idriss 2009: 95–96). If teachers attempt to identify the most extreme 
pupils, as in the selection of participants for the Tolerance Project, there is a risk of both over 
and under identification.  
 
Pitfalls of Targeted Initiatives 
The British Prevent strategy is a much cited and debated example of over-
identification, as many young Muslims were being regarded by their teachers as part of a 
‘suspect community’ which caused frustration and lack of trust among Muslim youths 
(Thomas 2016; Awan 2012; Kundnani 2009). Critics of the Prevent duty advocate citizenship 
education for all as the best way to prevent radicalization among youths, as it also promotes 
inclusion (Thomas 2016). The pitfall of targeting a small group of young individuals is the 
risk of creating a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’; that is, reducing an individual to the deviant 
quality, and thereby encouraging the person to display that quality (Merton 1948; Becker 
1973: 33–34). 
Comparable to young Muslims’ reactions to Prevent and similar strategies today, 
former members of racist movements have explained that the more the surrounding 
environment attacked and was suspicious of their behaviour and ideas, the more they were 












Lindahl and Matsson 2000; Fangen 1999). A suggested alternative to stigmatization and 
ostracism is establishing dialogue between adult prevention workers and youths that are 
perceived to be ‘at-risk’ (Fangen and Carlsson 2013: 334; Miller-Idriss 2009: 118; Mattsson 
and Adler 2008). The Tolerance Project has been developed within this dialogic framework. 
In this article, I examine how front-line professionals working with the TP balance the 
responsibility of identifying youths at-risk with the responsibility not to themselves encourage 
the creation of suspect communities at school. 
 
Method and Material 
 
The following analysis builds on participant observation in seven meetings where a group of 
front-line professionals discuss the implementation of the Tolerance Project in one or more 
municipalities. From May 2015 to June 2016, I lived in a Swedish region (county or län) that 
was starting up the Tolerance Project in several municipalities. Just before I started my 
fieldwork, eighteen teachers and social workers from the region had taken the course in 
Tolerance Project leadership at Gothenburg University. The decision to send pedagogues to 
the project leader course was made in 2014, and the start-up was coordinated by an employee 
at the regional crime prevention office, who functioned as my main gatekeeper by introducing 
me to the group and inviting me to TP-related sessions with the front-line professionals 
involved. Between December 2015 and June 2016, three regional half-day sessions were 
arranged by the coordinator. In these meetings, future and current project leaders who were 
working to implement the program at their respective schools met to discuss their progress 
and share best practice. The group of project leaders represented five municipalities and eight 
different schools. 
Four schools in four municipalities implemented the TP for the first time in 2015. Two 
schools had worked with it before and wanted to continue, and two schools wanted to start up 
but had not been allocated money by the municipality to actually do so. One of the four 












finish, from planning to execution. This allowed me to participate in local meetings that were 
held to discuss progress, together with the municipality employees involved. In total, four 
local TP meetings were held during the school year. Employees from two other schools in the 
same municipality participated in one of the local meetings to discuss further allocation of 
money. The main source of material for this analysis is thus from participant observation, 
with the meaning of being “present while they exercise certain activities typical of the 
environment or the organization they are a part of” (Fangen 2004: 1). The organization was 
the regional implementation of the Tolerance Project. To clarify unfinished discussions that 
occurred during the meetings, I initiated five open-ended conversations, with an interview 
guide based on a few key words (Repstad 2007: 78), on such topics as the motivations for 
working with the program and how the participating pupils had been recruited. 
Because I rely on naturally occurring speech and informal interview conversations, my 
field notes were often written down subsequent to my observations and I sometimes forgot 
who exactly said what. The point of this article, however, is not who said what, but how 
racism and intolerance was problematized in this particular local context of prevention. In that 
sense, the fieldwork had an institutional character, focusing on my informants’ practical work 
experiences, rather than being about them as individuals (Widerberg 2007). The informants 
were provided with oral and written information about me and my project, the first time we 
met. They also had the option of reading the quotations I used (only three of the informants 
took advantage of this opportunity though). I decided to preserve the anonymity of my 
informants, so I refrain from providing additional information about the region, the specific 
municipalities, or the schools involved. A description of the whole research project has been 
submitted and approved by the Swedish ethical committee EPN. 
 
Informants present in TP meetings Location and place of work 
Informant 1, 2 (interview) and 3 
(interview) 
Municipality 1, School 1 (Previous TP experience) 












Informant 7 Municipality 1, School 3 (No prior TP experience) 
Informant 8, 9, 10 (interview), 11 and 12 Municipality 1 several schools (Previous TP experience) 
Informant 13 (interview), 14 and 15 Municipality 2 several schools (Previous TP experience) 
Informant 16 and 17 Municipality 3, School 4 (TP implemented 2015) 
Informant 18 Municipality 4, School 5 (TP implemented 2015) 
 
Analytical Tool 
In order to answer which problematizations of racism and intolerance substantiate 
local implementations of the Tolerance Project, I draw on Bacchi’s ‘what’s the problem 
represented to be’ (WPR) approach developed for policy analysis (Bacchi 2009). While the 
WPR approach has been developed for questioning governmental policies, it is my argument 
that the approach is well suited for analysing local policies, such as municipal decisions to 
implement the Tolerance Project. The WPR approach starts from a concrete proposal, such as 
the decision to implement the TP, and works backwards to reveal what it represents—that is, 
different problematizations of racism and intolerance. Once one or several problem 
representations are identified, Bacchi suggests looking for the underlying assumptions or 
premises of each problematization. This can be conceptual logics, such as a widely used 
definition of racism, or political rationalities, such as the notion of youth governance. The 
third question in the WPR model builds on Foucauldian genealogy and concerns how a 
specific representation of the problem has historically come about. This must be seen in light 
of both the overall context in Sweden and the specific local context. I account for the latter 
below. The fourth question is about the silences, or what is not problematized, or alternatively 
how it could be thought about differently. For my purpose, the fifth question is especially 
interesting, as it concerns the potential effects on those involved, such as the ‘subjectification 
effect’ of the creation of target groups (Bacchi 2009: 15) or what is often referred to as 
suspect communities in the discourse of radicalization. The last question in Bacchi’s WPR 
approach builds on the question of genealogy and concerns the potential spread of specific 
problematizations: their ability to become legitimate or even hegemonic or, on the other hand, 












analysis (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002), the WPR approach is a way to distinguish between 
different world views and identify the power dimension in language use.  
  
Time and Situational Context 
Similar to a couple of other areas in Sweden, the particular region where I conducted 
my fieldwork has been argued to have had a continuous history of National Socialism, from 
the first party formation in the 1920s (Lööw 2015) to current activity such as posting flyers, 
hanging up banners and town square demonstrations. In 2015, the most active extreme 
nationalist group in the area was the NMR and a less organized activist group called the 
Nordic Youth (Nordisk Ungdom – NU), both of which stepped up their ‘refugees NOT 
welcome’ campaign during the summer. At this point, Sweden faced an increasing number of 
refugees and had to find new ways to settle them. Prior to 2015, most of the municipalities in 
the region had little or no experience with settling refugees, simply because the small areas 
(tettsteder) were not regarded, by arriving immigrants, as being as attractive as the big cities 
that already had large minority populations. This changed when the number of refugees 
exceeded the capacity of the big cities. New refugee reception centres were established in 
small areas outside the towns, such as where schools number 1 and 2 were located. There was 
great concern as to how best to integrate and accommodate the newly arrived children into 
schools that had had few immigrants beforehand. During this period, the work to settle newly 





Based on my informants’ discussions and personal experience with implementation of the 
Tolerance Project, I have identified several motivations and arguments for local 
implementation. Different problematizations of racism and intolerance were typically 












school or in their particular municipality. For analytical purposes, I have discerned four ideal 
types of problematization.  
 
 
1. Generational Racism 
The first time I met with the group of project leaders in the region, I was told a story 
that exemplified a recurring issues in the local discourse. In the hall of a local kindergarten 
where the children hang their jackets, someone had crossed out the names of two Somali 
children. The names were above the jacket hooks at a height that the school employee 
(informant 2) who told the story believed to mean that an adult must have made the crosses. 
She expressed further concerns about additional refugees coming to the area and what this 
would lead to. Here, the problem is represented to be negative attitudes toward immigrants 
within the local adult population, especially in combination with the establishment of new 
refugee reception centres in the area. When I talked to the school employee sometime later, 
she admitted the incident was rather rare and not typical at the time: 
 
“The problem is still there even if it is not very explicit: the old racists still live in the 
area and they have children who go to the school. People know who they are, at least 
which families.” 
 
A direct subjectification effect of this was that parents became part of the target group, as her 
colleague (informant 3) confirmed when we discussed the Tolerance Project in practice: 
 
“The parents should take part (in TP). The thought is that through the children you can 
reach the parents’ attitudes as well, but it is hard to document without following them 













“There is a culture of racism and xenophobia here, but not just xenophobia connected 
with immigrants from other countries, but toward everything that is strange and 
different, for example homosexuals, although this has gotten better lately.” 
 
The references to ‘old racists’ and ‘a culture of racism’ problematize racism in a historical 
perspective, confirming the geographic stronghold hypothesis (Lööw 2009) and the general 
socialization theory (Allport 1954). The underlying assumption of problematizing 
generational racism is the idea that parents or grandparents pass on their negative attitudes to 
their children. As expressed during a local TP meeting: “these thoughts are not coming from 
the children: it is contagious” (informant 2). During a conversation with a school employee 
(informant 4) in another small area, I came across a concrete example of this when we talked 
about why the Tolerance Project had been implemented at that particular school. 
 
“There is a group of boys who seek their identity by talking bad about immigrants. 
This talk led to concern among a group of peers, especially girls. (…) One of the boys 
was using SD rhetoric ‘let us help them [refugees] on site’. (…) When I confronted the 
boy during a personal conversation, he just said ‘This is coming from my grandfather, 
you should have heard him’.” 
 
The young boy that is described here tries to defend himself by saying that the way he talks 
about refugees is far from as bad as how his grandfather talks about this. Saying ‘let’s help 
them on site’ is not traditionally racist, but it has become a typical phrase concerning refugees 
in populist rhetoric, such as by the Sweden Democrats. It is, however, the school employee 
















2. Growth of the Sweden Democrats 
During the same conversation, an additional motivation for implementing the 
Tolerance Project was given. “The SD was at around 20 percent and there were few 
immigrants here beforehand” (informant 4). Problematizing the growth of the Sweden 
Democrats in the local area (tettsted) is, similarly to the first problem representation, 
combined with the establishment of new refugee reception centres and the potential tension 
that can arise from this. During the conversation, I was shown statistics of low levels of 
higher education in the specific area compared to other areas within the same municipality, 
and the school employee pointed to a “lack of research on socio-cultural factors, life stories 
and such” (informant 4). While this is a problematization of socio-economic relations and not 
necessarily the SD, a municipality employee involved in the same decision-making process 
(informant 10), linked the two elements together when we talked about the specific 
implementation. 
 
“We wanted to find a way to get at them (…) the Sweden Democrats is not Nazism, 
but it captures discontent in the local environment, for example in the old industrial 
towns where the women have gone to study or get a career, while the men are left 
unemployed and bitter. People in the countryside vote SD all over Sweden.” 
 
As with generational racism, the growth of the SD is here seen as a small-town phenomenon. 
The same motivation is given when I talk to a municipality employee (informant 13) active in 
the implementation of the Tolerance Project in a neighbouring non-urban area. 
 
“We wanted to make sure that there is no breeding ground for the Swedish Resistance 
Movement (now the NMR) for example, but also for the Sweden Democrats because 













The underlying assumption that legitimizes this condemnation is ‘once a racist party; always a 
racist party’, as in the governmental cordon sanitaire (Lööw 2009). Concern related to the 
growth of the SD was predominately expressed by municipality workers, but shown by the 
Tolerance Project leaders as well, by referring to some of the pupils in the group as having an 
“SD parent”. This alludes to the problem of generational racism as well: that parents will pass 
on negative attitudes to their children. In all the meetings I attended, there was no mention of 
any other party affiliations among the pupils’ parents. Whether the problematization of the 
growth of SD will continue to be reproduced or will be disrupted depends largely on the 
extent of SD’s continued polishing of its image and legitimacy nationwide, as well as the 
growing presence and visibility of the NMR constituting even more concern. 
 
3. Normalization of Racist Language 
A more immediate motivation for implementing the Tolerance Project was because of 
the “amount of racist statements heard in the hallways” (informant 4). Tolerance Project 
leaders frequently mentioned the use of negative language related to newly arrived 
immigrants and how teachers should handle it. The current situation was explained as being 
tense and consisting of “two camps at school, even among the teachers” (local meeting 2). 
One of the pedagogues expressed her concern in the following manner: “racial stuff appears 
all the time (...) what do you do…the place is permeated by this… a normalization of 
language use” (local meeting 2). The existence of two camps among school staff was 
exemplified by an ongoing discussion about whether to arrange a basic values day 
(verdigrunndag) when the new refugees were set to arrive. This had been suggested by a 
teacher at the school who was not involved in the Tolerance Project. The group present at the 
local TP meeting agreed that “it would only lead to more special treatment and targeting” 
(local meeting 2). If the school staff did not agree among themselves on questions of how to 
handle the newly arrived refugees, they believed it would cause further problems: “as 
teachers, we need to agree on these things so that some pupils don’t exploit the ambiguity and 












words, the concern that is expressed in this meeting is not just with some of the pupils, but 
also with some of the school staff.  
Another point on problematizing the normalization of racist language was that it might 
not be known in advance, but become apparent with the arrival of new refugees at school. A 
project leader from another municipality (informant 18) reported on the appearance of 
unexpected racist language. “Now that we have been working [with the TP] for a while, the 
attitudes appear … from the normal youth, brown [racist] attitudes, you feel naïve.” The 
underlying assumption of problematizing the normalization of racist language is the idea of a 
snowball effect; the more racist utterances flourish, the more people sympathize with them. 
The ‘pressure cooker theory’, on the other hand, emphasizes the idea that the more racial 
expressions are marginalized, the more extreme and expressive forms they assume once they 
find a place where they can be expressed (Ravndal 2017: 153). While allowing extreme 
attitudes to be heard is a central point of the Tolerance Project in theory, I did not hear this 
point in the discussions among the project leaders I met with. As with the problem of 
generational racism and the growth of the SD, problematizing the normalization of racist 
language has come about through a pro-immigration discourse, where anti-immigrant 
attitudes are labelled as deviating from the norm and hence need to be prevented.  
 
4. ‘At-risk’ Youth 
When discussing exactly which pupils are to be encouraged to apply for the Tolerance 
Projects, the teachers and social workers use the category behövs elever, literally ‘pupils in 
need’, meaning those who have a need for special attention or monitoring to prevent further 
social unrest at school. In both regional meetings and conversations with project leaders, the 
actual work they did was mainly understood to be a way of helping some of the pupils who 
otherwise would be struggling, either due to a learning difficulty or for social behavioural 
reasons, to finish school. “Pupils in need can for example be those who cannot write or 
express themselves in writing. Just that they get through the school with grades [is a desired 












be not much different from crime prevention in general and the role of school to foster 
democracy and guide children on the path to adulthood. “It is about making youngsters 
prepared to make wise choices in life” (informant 2). From my own observations of a project 
group before and after, and the many stories I have heard, emancipating pupils with low self-
esteem and trouble coping with school was a frequent element. A girl who did not speak in 
front of the class for eight years changed tremendously: “now she suddenly speaks, her 
parents even came to thanks us” (informant 16). As indicated in many defector stories and the 
national action plan against extremism, low self-esteem is seen as one of the breeding grounds 
for the White Power environment (Government Offices of Sweden 2011: 18).  
Reference to the NMR and the SD appeared less often when my informants talked 
about ‘pupils in need’, as the focus was more on the individual needs and actual problems at 
school. A frequent discussion topic among the project leaders was whether or not they had 
successfully recruited the pupils they initially thought could benefit the most from 
participating in the program. At some of the schools, the most troublesome kids had not 
applied for the program or had quit after a few weeks. Although this was sometimes the case, 
several of the project leaders emphasized that close friends of the so-called ‘pupils in need’ 
often joined. The underlying assumption was the potential spiralling effects of working 
preventively, creating a “culture of tolerance” at school (informant 2) or educating 
“ambassadors of tolerance” (informant 8). This is in accordance with the national perspective 
on safeguarding democracy (Government Offices of Sweden 2017; Government Offices of 
Sweden 2011). In this sense, the Tolerance Project can be argued to function as an extension 




By listening to my informants’ naturally occurring talk about their motivations for 
implementing or working with the Tolerance Project, I have traced how the problem of racism 












location. The findings I have presented are clearly limited to the timing of the implementation 
of the Tolerance Project, firstly as a response to the national growth of the Sweden Democrats 
in 2014 and secondly influenced by the national refugee crisis in 2015. Another context-
specific limitation of these findings is the local history underlying the problematization of 
generational racism, in that specific region. 
Most people I talked to were well aware of the historical existence of National 
Socialism in the specific region and in particular smaller areas. This most likely shaped their 
self-understanding and made them alert to potential threats of this kind. Effectively the mere 
awareness of a local racist past motivates front-line professionals to prevent future racism. It 
also suggests that pupils who are known to have racist parents or grandparents could be 
targets of intervention. As mentioned, the geographic stronghold theory must, however, be 
further explored to determine whether this is a real or perceived problem and whether there is 
any direct link between “old racists” and current forms of hostility toward immigrants.  
I was initially surprised to discover the extent to which the growth of Sweden 
Democrats was problematized when discussing implementation of a program to reduce 
recruitment to racist and Nazi organizations, considering that the SD is a democratically 
elected parliamentary party. On the other hand, condemnation of the party’s anti-immigrant 
propaganda and rhetoric has been the established norm in Swedish politics for as long as the 
party has existed. The racist label should thus come as no surprise for anyone who is a 
member or supporter of the SD; the question is whether this affects their children. A potential 
effect of problematizing the growth of the SD is that project leaders automatically label pupils 
with SD parent(s) as part of the target group for participating in the Tolerance Project. One of 
the municipality employees (informant 10) confirmed that there is a risk that pupils of SD 
parents might be targeted more often for participation in the program, but I have not gathered 
any data over time that supports this hypothesis, or whether this is a good or bad thing. As my 
findings show, most of the pedagogues who work with the Tolerance Project provide several 












Problematizing the normalization of racist language closely resembles the broad 
definition of racism that is found in the critical race theory framework and the Swedish plan 
against racism, xenophobia and hate crime (Government Offices of Sweden 2017). As with 
the first two problematizations, normalization of racist language was argued to be heightened 
with the establishment of new refugee reception centres and the arrival of refugees in the local 
areas and at school. Specific examples of this were often presented in the form of second-
hand information, such as the story from the kindergarten and the number of racial 
expressions that were heard in the hallway. Some of my informants mentioned witnessing 
wisecracks directed at or intended for some of the newly arrived refugees, but missing from 
the discussions were actual episodes of hate crimes or recent racially motivated violence in 
the area.  
Generational racism, the growth of the SD and normalization of racist language have 
in common the assumption that expressions of scepticism about immigrants in the young as 
well as in the adult populations is either a forerunner for engagement with racist organizations 
or expressions of racism today, and thus something to be prevented. The pro-immigrant 
discourse that was expressed by the Tolerance Project leaders is in line with a long tradition in 
Sweden of taking in refugees and promoting a multicultural society (Borevi 2012). The more 
the Swedish government regulates and restricts immigration, the more this tradition can 
potentially be disrupted. The first three problematizations also have in common that they 
complicate the government’s youth-focused approach and expose a limitation for the role of 
the school in prevention, as adults cannot be targeted by schools apart from through their 
children. In line with prior critique of the national action plan (Lööw et al. 2013), I 
recommend that future plans take this into consideration. 
Problematizing youth ‘at-risk’ corresponds to the national action plan against 
violence-promoting extremism (Government Offices of Sweden 2011), in the way that it 
suggests that some individuals are more prone to become radicalized than others, depending 
on their social or personal background. Front-line professionals working with the Tolerance 












adult life due to learning difficulties or for social behavioural reasons at school. In other 
words, the responsibility to prevent racism is not seen as distinct from the general mandate to 
foster and safeguard democracy. It should be noted that the Tolerance Project was developed 
long before the national security discourse tied the role of teachers to preventing 
radicalization, and is thus based on the basic principle of schools preparing children for adult 




In this article, I have applied a ‘What’s the problem represented to be’ approach to analyse 
material gathered from fieldwork with a group of front-line professionals working to prevent 
racism and intolerance in a Swedish region. To sum up, the local versions of the Tolerance 
Project that I have studied operate with a conglomeration of problematizations, of which I 
have presented four ideal types. There is every reason to believe that additional problem 
descriptions exist within the group I have studied and especially in other preventive 
environments. The point has been to show that front-line professionals interpret their role in 
prevention based on local problem analysis and not predominately on national 
recommendations. This means that, although national action plans might seem oversimplified 
at first glance, there is not a one-to-one transmission of the seemingly simplistic suggestions, 
especially not when interpreted by a group of front-line professionals specifically dedicated to 
the task. The overall effect of the various problematizations is to create a broad and varied 
target group, thus minimizing the potential stigmatization of some pupils that might have 
resulted if the project had focused only on one problem or one narrowly defined target group. 
Because of this, it is my argument that the model, consisting of a trained group of 
professionals working with a selected and most importantly mixed group of pupils, is well 
suited to prevent all forms of radicalization. In an upcoming article I will account for what is 
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